India - Pakistan relations

India - Pakistan relations

For any country, in the way of development, needs cordial relations with its neighbors in political, social and global issues to create a healthy environment for development. Pakistan, one of the most important neighbor of India was once homogeneous political unit with India before independence and the struggle for freedom was fought collectively. India’s relations with Pakistan are the most complex of its ties with its neighbors and can be understand by following historical events :

Historical background :

Before independence, India was a single unit in its composition i.e. Hindus and Muslims were living together and the struggle for freedom was fought collectively against British Empire. Indian national congress & Muslim league were two groups among various others who fought for freedom. During this struggle many differences of opinion were emerged among the elites of Muslim league and Indian national congress. Muslim league wanted to club all Muslim dominations to create separate country i.e Pakistan, but INC was against it. Finally, when India got freedom, many small states, provinces & princely states joined independent ‘India as Union of States’ except Hyderabad, Junagarh & Kashmir. Pakistan was separated from India and became a Muslim country. Pakistan was in greed of assimilating these 03 states who didn’t join India, but couldn’t succeed. Junagarh & Hyderabad joined India and Kashmir accepted Indian sovereignty. Thus the Islamic country Pakistan failed in its intention to enlarge its political boundary. This bitterness travelled along with the time and still existing in terms of Pakistan’s approach towards India in all international spheres. Four wars with India, terrorism & Ceasefire violation along the boundary of Kashmir & Gujrat depicts clear bitterness and bad intention of Pakistan against India.

Issues in bilateral relations with India & Pakistan:

We can categorize bilateral relations with India & Pakistan in three ways

1.      Difference in world views

2.      Dispute Over Kashmir

3.      Nuclear Confrontation

Difference in world views

India and Pakistan, as two core countries of South Asia had different worldviews that determined their foreign policies.

India’s world Views

·         During the early years after independence, the Indian worldview had been

dominated by concerns about building a regional identity of the post-colonial nations of Asia.

·         One of the important aspects of this policy was opposition to the extra regional intervention in South Asia. India sought to keep the South Asian issues within the ambit of South Asian countries.

·         Opposition to the entry of Cold War alliances in Asia and eventual path of non-alignment is part of this worldview.

·         The period from 1947 to 1971 saw two trends in India’s approach towards South Asia. One was the trend that was initiated by Nehru. It focused on regionalism as the dominant theme. The second emerged during the Lal Bahadur Shastri years. This came in the aftermath of the 1962 war and the need for resetting the Indian worldview keeping in mind its capabilities. Shastri was to stress on bilateralism as the key to foreign policy, especially in relationto South Asian countries.

Pakistan’s world views

·         Pakistan’s perception of its role emerged from the realisation of two simultaneous forces—the geopolitics of the country that was divided between East and West Pakistan and the Islamic worldview. The former placed Pakistan firmly in the South Asian regional state system while the latter brought it close to the Islamic world of West Asia.

·         Pakistan thus saw itself as a nation with two distinct identities and roles, that of a South Asian power and that of an Islamic West Asian power that was to eventually emerge as an important country of the Organisation of Islamic Conference.

·         One of the dominant security concerns that Pakistan sought to address right from its

inception is that of fear of India. The problem of Pakistan’s foreign and defence policy revolved around this central theme of Indian domination and safeguards that were to be instituted to counter this threat.

·         Pakistan’s attempts to establish linkages with the Islamic world, with China

and participate in the military alliances of the United States can be understood within this security concern of Pakistan. These links provided an opportunity for Pakistan to counteract India’s desire to dominate in what India considered its sphere of influence.

Dispute Over Kashmir

This fundamental diversity in the views of India and Pakistan manifests on the issue of Kashmir, an issue that has come to be identified by Pakistan as the core of the bilateral divide.

·         Kashmir, like Junagadh and Hyderabad, opted to decide its future as to whether to join India or to merge with Pakistan.

·         In case of Hyderabad and Junagadh, the Indian government took steps to ensure that the wishes of the overwhelming local Hindu populace were respected and hastened the process of merger of these two states in the Indian Union.

·         Kashmir had a peculiar problem. Ithad distinct distribution patterns of its population, with the Ladakh area being predominantly Buddhist, the Jammu region Hindu and the Kashmir valley Muslim. Pakistan sought to force the pace of the decision making on Kashmir by permitting the ‘irregular army’ to enter Kashmir.

·         Maharaja Hari Singh, realising the potential problems, signed the Instrument of Accession with India, thus merging the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian Union.

The first Indo-Pakistan war that followed the merger of Kashmir into India left the state partitioned. India took the matter to the United Nations and agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiris. According to the cease-fire resolution adopted by the UN Security Council, the plebiscite was conditional upon the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kashmir and the restoration of the situation to the pre 1947 position. This condition was never met by Pakistan and the plebiscite also never came to be conducted.

Kashmir has seen a tumultuous history since the first war of 1948. The new government formed by Sheikh Abdullah, a Kashmiri leader of long standing, came to be dismissed in 1953. Sheikh Abdullah was relieved of his post as his party the National Conference refused to accept the accession to India as final and vaguely talked of the final settlement of the state of Kashmir in the future. Sheikh Abdullah was brought back to head the government in Kashmir in 1975 after he and Indira Gandhi signed an agreement. Now Sheikh Abdullah had given up the earlier separatist demand and had accepted Kashmir to be legitimately a part of India. In 1965, India and Pakistan fought a war over Kashmir. This war, as the Pakistani Air Marshal Asghar Khan put it, was a war to solve the problem once and for all. The Tashkent Conference (1966) also failed to provide any results. Though, the 1971 war was more a war about the future of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, it had a definite aspect of Kashmir about it.

The Simla Agreement of 1972 formalised the emergent situation on Kashmir. The agreement sought to establish some basic principles of Indo-Pakistan interaction. The Agreement specifically refers to bilateralism and acceptance of durable peace as the framework of resolving future India-Pakistan problems. On the very vital issue of Kashmir the agreement states: ‘In Jammu and Kashmir the line of actual control resulting from the cease fire of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line’.

The Simla Agreement sought to create a new framework of interaction for India and Pakistan and freeze the issue of Kashmir along the Line of Control indefinitely. One understands from the writings of Indian leaders involved in the making of this agreement that there was an implicit understanding of converting the LOC into a boundary in the eventual future. It is in this context that the return of Sheikh Abdullah became significant. Now India had a Kashmiri leader, heading a Kashmiri party the National Conference, taking the position that Kashmir is part of India. This was tantamount to a plebiscite. This was the test of the right to self-determination that the Kashmiris had been promised by the plebiscite. India could now talk of political legitimacy for the accession of Kashmir to India.

Several developments appear to complicate the problem in Kashmir in the 1980s. Global Islamic resurgence came to be a force to reckon with. The growth of fundamentalist Islamic groups and the spread in their activity had become a matter of concern even for the United States. Pakistan was in a unique position in those days. Given its relatively liberal Islamic posture and the possibility of emergent democratic governments in Pakistan led it to retain a relatively close relationship with United States. On the other hand, it had excellent relations with the core Islamic world. It had an excellent access to the new Afghan government of Taliban and also to other radical Islamic organisations. Pakistan thus appears to have benefited from the then international situation.

The post-1975 developments on Kashmir constitute the beginning of an entirely new chapter in its history. Adverse reactions to Sheikh Abdullah rule started in the late 1970s. Partly it was a product of the growing divide between the ruling class in Kashmir and the common populace that remained deprived of the fruits of development that the state sought to create. Partly, it was the product of resultant frustration that came to be created in the minds of the Kashmiri about the utility of Indian rule. One of the significant popular level movements came in the form of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). As an organisation that had strong Pakistani connections, the JKLF demanded the right to self-determination for the Kashmiris to join Pakistan.

The 1980s saw two significant developments that had their impact on the developments in Kashmir. One was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that led to the massive arms supply by the United States to the Afghan rebels (Mujahideen) situated in Pakistan. Second was the change in Pakistani strategy regarding Kashmir. The American arms supply to the Afghans had a spillover effect in Kashmir. This was linked to the change in Pakistani tactics in terms of shifting from direct conflict to insurgency.

Infiltration and insurgency has been a long pattern in Pakistani strategy on Kashmir. Prior to the 1965 war Pakistan had used this approach with little success. The failure to solve the problem

through the use of force in 1965 and 1971 had led to a change in strategy. Now infiltration took the shape of low intensity conflict. Efforts to paralyse the local law and order situation and create uncertainty in the region came to be the tactics of the day. The large scale exit of the Kashmiri pundits from the valley was part of this protracted strategy.

This Pakistani strategy was buttressed with a new clarion call of human rights violation. In the early 1990s, concern about violation of human rights had suddenly acquired newly found acceptance. In Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere, the world appeared to have suddenly become sensitive to human rights. In Kashmir too, the old paradigm of self-determination was fast replaced by the new paradigm of human rights violation. Suddenly the situation in Kashmir came to be analysed almost entirely along the human dimension. Demands came to be made by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), followed by the European powers for an on-the spot survey of violation of human rights by the Indian forces. The Indian government was persuaded enough to create a National Human Rights Commission of its own to monitor the problem. It took several years for the international community to acknowledge that terrorist outfits also violate human rights and that the responsibility of violation cannot be that of the Government alone.

In 1999 India and Pakistan came into conflict over an intrusion by Pakistan into Kargil. Was the crossing of the LOC by the Mujahideens, and the Pakistani troops a logical culmination of the ongoing approach taken on Kashmir? Did it represent an assessment by Pakistan that time was ripe to exert direct force by crossing the LOC and force India to resolve the Kashmir problem? Several explanations may be given for this Pakistani adventurism. One, that Pakistan must have assessed the time as being ripe for such an action to achieve its goal about accession of Kashmir. The political uncertainty in India and the obvious lack of consensus across the political spectrum in India would have also been one of the considerations. Two, this assessment must have been a military and intelligence assessment based on the active participation of the militant outfits. It was quite likely that the civil government was pulled into this decision after it was in place. If this be true it confirms the pattern of Pakistani politics that is dominated by competing interests of the army, the civilian representative elite, the intelligence units and the Islamic groups. The Pakistani premier’s constant disclaim about the involvement of Government in the Kargil action may not be entirely true. Such actions cannot take place without the knowledge and participation of the government (and that includes the army). But his statement may also indicate the truth that he has very little control over the Pakistan army and militant groups in Kargil. History shows that the creators of such groups eventually cease to control them as they tend to have a momentum oftheir own.

Having committed itself in Kargil, Pakistan appeared to have taken on more than it could digest. The international public opinion has shifted away from Pakistan. Its old and trusted ally China took a neutral position and advised restraint and dialogue. The Pakistani premier was not able to move the United States either. The US visit of premier Sharif proved counter productive. The Americans asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops to the LOC and begin a dialogue with India. Eventually, India did manage to push back the Pakistani infiltration.

Wars with Pakistan

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947

This is also called the First Kashmir War. The war started in October 1947 when it was feared by the Pakistan that Maharajah of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu might accede to India as choice was given to him on the matter to accede to any of the newly independent nations. Tribal forces from Pakistan attacked and occupied the princely state, resulting in Maharajah signing the Agreement to the accession of the princely state to India. The United Nations was invited by India to mediate the quarrel resulting in the UN Security Council passing Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948. The war ended in December 1948 with the Line of Control dividing Kashmir into territories administered by Pakistan (northern and western areas) and India (southern, central and northeastern areas).

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

This war started following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India. India retaliated by launching an attack on Pakistan. The five-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and was witness to the largest tank battle in military history since World War II. The outcome of this war was a strategic stalemate with some small tactical victories. However, most neutral assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared.  The war concluded after diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and USA and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

The war was unique in that it did not involve the issue of Kashmir, but was rather precipitated by the crisis created by the political battle between Sheikh Mujib, Leader of East Pakistan and Yahya-Bhutto, leaders of West Pakistan brewing in erstwhile East Pakistan culminating in the declaration of Independence of Bangladesh from the state system of Pakistan. Following Operation Searchlight and the 1971 Bangladesh atrocities, about 10 million Bengalis in East Pakistan took refuge in neighbouring India. India intervened in the ongoing Bangladesh liberation movement.  After a large scale pre-emptive strike by Pakistan, full-scale hostilities between the two countries commenced. Within two weeks of intense fighting, Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to the joint command of Indian and Bangladeshi forces following which the People's Republic of Bangladesh was created. This war saw the highest number of casualties in any of the India-Pakistan conflicts, as well as the largest number of prisoners of war since the Second World War after the surrender of more than 90,000 Pakistani military and civilians.

Indo-Pakistani War of 1999

Commonly known as Kargil War, this conflict between the two countries was mostly limited. During early 1999, Pakistani troops along with Kashmiri insurgents infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) and occupied Indian territory mostly in the Kargil district. India responded by launching a major military and diplomatic offensive to drive out the Pakistani infiltrators. Fearing large-scale escalation in military conflict, the international community, led by the United States, increased diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to withdraw forces from Indian territory. By the end of July 1999, organized hostilities in the Kargil district had ceased.

Nuclear Confrontation

In 1998, India conducted a nuclear Test and shortly after Pakistan too demonstrated that it possessed the nuclear bomb. South Asia suddenly became a sensitive zone on account of these two antagonistic states. Pakistan’s new nuclear deterrence made India hesitant in retaliating against its support to the secessionist movement.

This nuclear blackmail continued with the infiltration in Kargil. This was a challenging period for India and the American scholars argued that South Asia was literally on a short fuse.

The nuclear conflict between both countries is of passive strategic nature with nuclear doctrine of Pakistan stating a first strike policy, although the strike would only be initiated if and only if, the Pakistan Armed Forces are unable to halt an invasion (as for example in1971 war) or a nuclear strike is launched against Pakistan while India has a declared policy of no first use.

Breief details of wars between India & Pakistan is as following :

·         Pokhran-I (Smiling Buddha): On 18 May 1974 India detonated an 8 Kiloton nuclear device at Pokhran Test Range becoming the first nation to become nuclear capable outside the five permanent members of United Nations Security Council as well as dragging Pakistan along with it into a nuclear arms race with the Pakistani prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto swearing to reciprocate India. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Munir Ahmed Khan said that the test would force Pakistan to test its own nuclear bomb.

·         Kirana-I: In 1980s a series of 24 different cold tests were conducted by Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission led by chairmanMunir Ahmad Khan under extreme secrecy. The tunnels at Kirana Hills, Sargodha, are reported to have been bored after the Chagai nuclear test sites, it is widely believed that the tunnels were constructed sometime between 1979 and 1983. As in Chagai, the tunnels at Kirana Hills had been bored and then sealed and this task was also undertaken by PAEC's DTD. Later due to excessive US intelligence and satellite focus on the Kirana Hills site, it was abandoned and nuclear weapons testing was shifted to the Kala Chitta Range.

·         Pokhran-II (Operation Shakti): On 11 May 1998 India detonated another 5 nuclear devices at Pokhran Test Range. With jubilation and large scale approval from the Indian society came International sanctions as a reaction to this test. The most vehement reaction of all coming from Pakistan. Great ire was raised in Pakistan, which issued a severe statement claiming that India was instigating a nuclear arms race in the region. Pakistan vowed to match India's nuclear capability with statements like, "We are in a headlong arms race on the subcontinent."

·         Chagai-I: (Youm-e-Takbir) Within half a month of Pokhran-II, on 28 May 1998 Pakistan detonated 5 nuclear devices to reciprocate India in the nuclear arms race. Pakistani public, like the Indian, reacted with a celebration and heightened sense of nationalism for responding to India in kind and becoming the only Muslim nuclear power. The day was later given the title Youm-e-Takbir to further proclaim such.

·         Chagai-II: Two days later, on 30 May 1998, Pakistan detonated a 6th nuclear device completing its own series of underground tests with this being the last test the two nations have carried out to date.

In spite of the many contentious issues, India and Pakistan have made major strides in reducing the "trust deficit” over the past few years. Bilateral dialogue was resumed after the two Prime Ministers met on the sidelines of SAARC Summit in Thimpu in April 2010 and reaffirmed the importance of carrying forward with the dialogue process with a view to resolving peacefully all outstanding issues. Subsequent regular exchanges between the two countries, including at the highest level, have kept the discussions active on Counter Terrorism, Humanitarian issues, Commerce and Trade, Sir Creek and Siachen, Peace and Security including Confidence building Measures and Jammu & Kashmir. The second round of the resumed dialogue is nearing completion and the two sides have expressed satisfaction on progress made so far.

India has welcomed Pakistan’s efforts to normalize trade relations by moving from positive to negative lists and their eventual elimination. India in turn has allowed foreign direct investment from Pakistan and is ready to formalize new visa regime with Pakistan.

Prime Minister met with the President of Pakistan during his pilgrimage tour to India in April 2012 and reiterated their willingness to find practical and pragmatic solutions to all outstanding issues through constructive and result oriented engagement. They reaffirmed that people are at the heart of the relationship between the two countries and that people to people contacts and cultural exchanges should be promoted.